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Abstract Cloud computing has become a hot topic both in research and in industry,
and when making decisions on deploying/adopting cloud computing related solu-
tions, security has always been a major concern. This article summarizes security
related issues in cloud computing and proposes five service deployment models to
address these issues. The proposed models provide different security related features
to address different requirements and scenarios and can serve as reference models for
deployment.
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1 Introduction
Extensive research efforts have been put on cloud computing and its related technolo-
gies, resulting in several well acknowledged cloud computing theories and technolo-
gies.
Cloud computing is a collection of technologies that allow IT resources to be
virtualized, used on an on-demand basis and delivered via the Internet as services.
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2Fig. 1 Cloud Technology Stack
Hence, virtualization, utility computing, and service oriented computing are three of
the most important underlying technologies.
Cloud computing is typically described as a three layer stack, with each layer
providing its own services, as illustrated in Figure 1. The Cloud Infrastructure Service
or the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provides IT infrastructures as a service over
computer networks. The Cloud Platform Service or the Platform as a Service (PaaS)
delivers computing platforms as a service to sustain the cloud applications. The Cloud
Application Services or Software as a Service (SaaS) delivers software as a service
over the network, allowing users to use applications without having to install and run
software on their own computers. The deployment models proposed in the rest of this
article illustrate how applications can be deployed on the Cloud Platform and the way
applications interact with each other.
One of the identifying characters of cloud computing is that computing is deliv-
ered via the Internet as services. This has the following implications.
– Computing and IT resource are encapsulated as services, hiding all the details of
implementation, deployment, maintenance and administration.
– Computing will be shifted from on-premise systems to remote systems. Users are
connected to the IT infrastructure via the Internet.
– Individual organizations will lose control of their IT systems to some extent, as
the IT infrastructure is provided over the Internet and is likely leased from cloud
operators.
With cloud computing, deployment of IT systems and data storage is changed
from on-premises user-owned IT infrastructures to off-premises third-party IT infras-
tructures. Having the whole IT systems and data on an infrastructure with limited
controls creates an obstacle for migrating traditional IT systems and data into clouds,
as users have the following concerns,
– Limited control over the IT infrastructure may incur security issues, such as ser-
vice availability due to failure of a single cloud operator, data confidentiality and
integrity, and so on.
– Having the whole IT system and data on a single cloud may give the cloud oper-
ator excessive power for controlling and modifying users’ IT system and data.
This article aims to develop deployment models for cloud computing based ap-
plications for addressing the security related concerns in cloud computing. To be
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chitecture for deploying IT systems based on cloud computing across multiple cloud
providers. This article argues that the proposed deployment models can address dif-
ferent issues that users are concerned about when deploying IT systems over cloud
computing. The techniques used in addressing the user concerns include separat-
ing the duties across multiple cloud operators, providing redundancy across multi-
ple clouds, mandating interaction between clouds, isolating different involved parties
from each other for anti-collusion, and implementing cryptographic operations.
This article is organized is as follows. Section 2 identifies the security concerns
that users have when adopting cloud computing. Section 3 surveys the related work.
Section 4 presents five different deployment models to address the security concerns.
Section 5 summarizes the security features provided by the models. Section 6 con-
cludes the article and suggests possible future research.
2 Cloud Security Challenges
It has been suggested that cloud computing related security can be classified into
three categories: cloud computing security, security for cloud computing, and cloud
computing for security [12].
Cloud computing security refers to the security of a cloud computing system’s
infrastructure that guarantees system confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Security for cloud computing refers to the trust on the services that users enjoy
when the users work with the services delivered using cloud computing technology.
Cloud computing for security involves using cloud computing technologies to
develop and deliver security solutions for IT systems.
2.1 Security Threats
Several security threats towards cloud computing have been discussed. The security
threats can be summarized as follows.
– Security threats from IT systems. Cloud computing systems are built on top of
cloud computing providers’ IT systems. It is inevitable that there are potential
security weaknesses in these IT systems. These weaknesses will weaken the cloud
computing services that are built on top.
– Security threats from external services. Users work on applications provided by
cloud computing service providers. Details of the applications and the underlying
services are not known to the users. Hence users cannot adopt any security pro-
tection on their own accord, and they will have to rely on the cloud computing
service providers to ensure security.
– Security threats incurred by concentrated resources. Cloud computing concen-
trates various IT resources to provide extreme capacity beyond any individual IT
systems. The large amount of concentrated resources will attract the attentions of
malicious users and become attractive targets for attacks.
42.2 Users’ Security Concerns
Security concerns have been raised due to the new computing model introduced by
cloud computing, which is characterized by off-premises computing, lost control of
IT infrastructure, service-oriented computing, virtualization, and so on. Security con-
cerns from users can be briefly summarized as follows.
– Fault tolerance and service availability. When keeping data at remote systems
owned by others, data owners may suffer from system failures of the service
provider, as system failures will mean that data will become unavailable if the
data depends on a single service provider. Similarly, when deploying IT systems
over a single cloud, services may be unavailable if the cloud goes out of operation.
– Data migration. Users that adopt cloud computing may be subject to the risk that
their data cannot be migrated to other clouds. Without the capability of migrat-
ing data to other clouds, users may be forced to stay with a cloud if they have
considerable dependence on the data.
– Data confidentiality and integrity. Data generated by cloud computing services
are normally kept in the clouds as well. Keeping data in the clouds means users
may lose control of their data and rely on cloud operators to enforce access control
[40,6], thus they may not be able to prevent unauthorized disclosure or malicious
modification of their data.
These concerns have been identified in several earlier works [24,6]. Armbrust
et al. [6]. considered these concerns as the top three obstacles to growth of cloud
computing, listed as Availability of Services, Data Lock-In, and Data Confidentiality
and Auditability.
3 Related Work
Extensive research efforts have been put into cloud computing and its related tech-
nologies, resulting in several well acknowledged cloud computing theories and tech-
nologies, including MapReduce [15] and its implementation Apache Hadoop [5],
Microsoft Dryad [23], Microsoft DryadLINQ [46], and Condor DAGman [13].
A few cloud platforms and cloud infrastructures have been reported, including
Eucalyptus [16,32], Nimbus [31], Kupa [27], Wispy [42], CARMEN [10]. The in-
dustry is providing services based on cloud computing technologies, such as Amazon
EC2 [1], Amazon Simple Storage Service [2], Microsoft Live Mesh [29], Salesforce
[37], Google File System [18], and Google App Engine [19], and so on.
3.1 Security Concerns
Armbrust et al. [6] identified ten obstacles to growth of cloud computing, arguing that
these were the most ten important obstacles. The identified obstacles include avail-
ability of service, data lock-in, data confidentiality and auditability, data transfer bot-
tlenecks, performance upredictability, scalable storage, bugs in large distributed sys-
tems, scaling quickly, reputation fate sharing, and software licensing. The top three
5obstacles are actually very close to the concerns identified in Section 2.2, which are
the issues that our proposed deployment models try to address.
Various security related issues and concerns in cloud computing have been iden-
tified and are under study, including data privacy [33,34,24], data protection [14],
access control [21,11,24], availability [41], authentication [43,28], scalability [47],
and so on.
3.2 Cloud Security
Several banks have experience with security infrastructure provided as cloud com-
puting services. Boiling Springs Savings Bank and Ulster Savings Bank relied on a
security-on-demand provider’s security services to maintain their internal networks’
security compliance with related regulation [3,4]. Both banks reported that a higher
level of security had been achieved with lower cost.
Cloud storage, which is in fact a form of data storage outsourcing, incurs concerns
on data security, such as data integrity and data confidentiality. Singh et al. [40] pro-
posed an indexing scheme that can build indices with access control information for
searching encrypting data, to implement access control on the searching of encrypted
outsourced data kept on a cloud.
3.3 Security Patterns
Security patterns have been accepted as a structural way and an established practice
for secure system designs and implementations. They provide guidelines as well as
knowledge that is proven and standardized [39,20].
Existing security patterns include the ROLE pattern [44], the ASSET VALU-
ATION pattern [38], the ROLE BASED ACCESS pattern [26], the REPLICATED
SYSTEM pattern [9], and others [30,9]. Successful cases have been reported on ap-
plying security patterns in building critical infrastructures and secure systems, such
as [17] and [8].
3.4 Architectural Models
Domain security is a method developed by Qinetiq to develop architectural models
for applications based on security requirements [22,36]. The architectures generated
by the Domain Security method focus on the software engineering aspect of systems
to implement, instead of security protocols, cryptographic operations, and so on.
The study reported in [45] presents architecture for the provision of basic prop-
erties of data secrecy, authentication, and replay protection for ad hoc networks. The
architecture relies on cryptography techniques to implement the properties.
The RESERVOIR project [7] aims to develop architecture for multiple cloud
providers to dynamically federate with each other to construct a seemingly infinite
pool of IT resources with the autonomy of technological and business management
decisions preserved.
6Keahey et al. [25] suggests that with the emergence of cloud computing, virtual
sites can be constructed over distributed resources spanning several clouds.
In a priliminary work [48], we have proposed to address cloud computing security
concerns at architecture levels, by using specifically designed architectures.
4 Reference Deployment Models for Cloud Computing Security
We have devised five reference deployment models for cloud computing that pro-
gressively address user security concerns; the separation model, availability model,
migration model, tunnel model, and encryption model. In the following, we describe
a typical scenario and the details of each model.
4.1 Separation
4.1.1 Scenario
On the adoption of cloud computing, users are putting their applications and data onto
a remote system that is not owned or controlled by them. The users will rely heavily
on the remote system. This means that the remote system operator can potentially
abuse its power by modifying the data at will and by refusing service requests from
the users, and so on. This concern could reduce users’ trust in cloud computing to a
level where they will not put any critical applications or data onto the cloud.
4.1.2 Separation Model
One of the key internal control mechanisms, separation of duty, is a very important
method to prevent fraud, errors, and abuse of privileges. To implement separation
of duty, it is required that at least two or more principals are involved in any single
transaction. Each principal is responsible for only part of the transaction. The basic
principle is to split the duties among the principals such that none of the principals
would have excessive control over critical processes.
Figure 2 demonstrates a possible design based on the concept of separation of
duty for cloud computing targeting a most basic case where data need to be processed
and stored. The main idea is to have two independent services responsible for data
processing and data storage. Data are presented to users and are processed by the
Data Processing Service. When the data need to be stored, they are handed over to
the Cloud Storage Service by the Data Processing Service, which will make the data
persistent and ready for retrieval in the future.
To implement the separation model shown above, the following requirements
must be met,
– At least two independent service providers are involved.
– The services should be provided by different providers respectively.
– Each service should be responsible for only one of the critical processes involved
in a transaction.
7Fig. 2 Separation Model
The Separation Model mandates that at least two different cloud computing ser-
vice providers be involved in a transaction. To some extent, this prevents some frauds
and errors by preventing any single service provider from having excessive control
over the transactions.
4.2 Availability
4.2.1 Scenario
Cloud computing users are normally concerned with service availability. Service
provider may go out of service unexpectedly. If a single service provider going out
of service could jeopardize the services users depend on due to system break down,
users will be seriously concerned about the availability of the services they need.
4.2.2 Availability Model
An availability model similar to the banking system for cloud computing can be de-
veloped to ensure the availability of users’ data. Figure 3 illustrates the availability
model built on top of a cloud infrastructure. With the availability model, a user can
work on her data via a data processing service, and the data will be kept on a cloud
storage service. To ensure the availability of the services, there are at least two in-
dependent data processing services, Data Processing Service A and Data Processing
Service B respectively, and two independent data storage services, Cloud Storage Ser-
vice C and Cloud Storage Service D. Either one of the data processing services can
have access to the data on either one of the cloud storage service. Data are replicated
and synchronized via a Replication Service.
To implement the Availability model shown above, the following requirements
must be met.
8Fig. 3 The Availability Model
– There exist at least two independent cloud computing providers that provide
equivalent Data Processing Services, and two independent cloud computing providers
that provide equivalent Data Storage Services.
– Replication of data between the two cloud storage services should be bi-directional
as well as transparent to users.
– Data from either of the cloud storage services are available to all the Data Pro-
cessing services, provided that the required credentials are presented.
The Availability model imposes redundancy on both data processing and cloud
storage. Hence there is no single point of failure with respect to data access. When a
data processing service or a cloud storage service experiences failure, there is always
a backup service present to ensure the availability of the data.
4.3 Migration
4.3.1 Scenario
When data on clouds are forced to stay on the cloud platforms where they are kept,
users will be forced to stay with the cloud providers unless they decide to give up
their data. Cloud providers can then ask for premium fees for their services, which
could be far beyond reasonable. This is not an acceptable situation when the users
heavily depend on the data or the data otherwise are critical.
As a result, these users will adopt cloud computing only when they are assured
that their data can be freely migrated to other clouds. Therefore, a model that can
ensure the capability of migrating data from one cloud to another is imperative in this
case.
4.3.2 Migration Model
Figure 4 demonstrates a model where the migration of data is guaranteed. Users pro-
cess their data via a Data Processing Service, where the data are kept on Cloud Stor-
age Service A. The Cloud Data Migration Service can interact with Cloud Storage
9Fig. 4 Migration Model
Service A and another cloud storage service, namely Cloud Storage Service B. The
Cloud Data Migration Service can move data from Cloud Storage Service A to Cloud
Storage Service B, and vice versa. In this way, users need not worry about their data
being excessively controlled by a cloud provider, knowing that they can switch to an-
other service provider by moving the data out from the current cloud storage service
provider to another.
To implement the Migration Model, the following requirements must be met.
– There is a Cloud Data Migration Service that can interact with the Cloud Storage
Service that keeps users’ data for exporting users’ data.
– There is a second Cloud Storage Service that allows users to import data and
export data.
– The two Cloud Storage Services should be provided by two independent cloud
providers.
4.4 Tunnel
4.4.1 Scenario
The Separation model described in Section 4.1 separates the processing from the
storing of data for the purpose of preventing frauds and errors. It is effective with the
assumption that the two service providers will not collude with each other. To ensure
the assumption, it is necessary to isolate the two service providers by cutting all the
direct communication between them. In this case, neither of the service providers will
be able to identify each other, and filtering can be imposed on the communication
between the two service providers.
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4.4.2 Tunnel Model
Figure 5 demonstrates the Tunnel Model. The Tunnel model introduces a tunnel ser-
vice located between the Data Processing Service and the Data Storage Service. The
tunnel servers as a communication channel between the Data Processing Service and
the Cloud Storage Service. It is responsible for providing an interface for the two
services to interact with each other, for manipulating and retrieving data. The tunnel
can in fact be implemented as a service as well.
With the Tunnel Model, the Data Processing Service manipulates data based on
the interface provided by the Data Tunneling Service. The Data Processing Service
does not need to care about details of the Cloud Storage Service, such as location,
identity, etc. On the other hand, the Cloud Storage Service will not be able to relate
the data it keeps with a specific data processing service. This achieves a complete iso-
lation between data processing and data storage, as well as the two service providers.
It will be extremely difficult for the Data Processing Service to collude with the Cloud
Storage service for fraud.
4.5 Cryptography
4.5.1 Scenario
Both the Separation Model and the Tunnel Model isolates the service provider re-
sponsible for storing data from the service provider responsible for processing data,
preventing the Data Processing service from arbitrary manipulation of the data. But
they are incapable of preventing unauthorized data disclosure or unauthorized mod-
ification on the data by the Cloud Storage Service. The confidentiality and integrity
cannot be ensured.
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4.5.2 Cryptography Model
For critical applications, the security of data, especially confidentiality and integrity,
are key requirements. Data confidentiality and integrity are in most cases dependent
on cryptography support.
The Cryptography Model, as illustrated by Figure 6, augments the Tunnel Model
with a Cryptography Service, which provides support for cryptographic operations
on data. The Data Processing Service feeds data to the Data Tunneling Service for
persistence. The Data Tunneling Service will invoke the Cryptography Service to per-
form a cryptographic operation on the data before handing the data over to the Cloud
Storage Service. Thus the data kept by the Cloud Storage Service are cryptographi-
cally processed, meaning that they could be ciphertext that can only be read by those
who have the decryption key, or they could be data augmented with digital signatures
or message authentication codes, and so on, depending on the security requirements.
On accessing the data, the Data Tunneling Service will first retrieve the encrypted
data from the Cloud Storage Service. The retrieved data are then decrypted by the
Cryptography Service if they are encrypted, or are verified by the Cryptography Ser-
vice if they are associated with digital signatures or message authentication codes,
etc. The decrypted data would then be sent to the Data Processing Service for pro-
cessing.
With the Cryptography Model, data can be stored in their cryptographically pro-
cessed form. As the Data Tunneling Service hides the Cryptography Service from the
Data Processing Service and the Cloud Storage Service, the cryptographic operations
are transparent to the Data Processing Service and the Cloud Storage Service. The
Data Processing Service and the Cloud Storage Service will not have access to the
12
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data without the cryptographc key. Data access, such as reading and modifying the
data, is well protected by cryptography. In the case of encrypted data, the decryption
key will be required. While in the case of digital signed data, all modification will
need to be validated by producing new signatures with the needed keys.
5 Model Analysis
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the models discussed in Section 4. The rela-
tions can be summarized as follows.
The Separation Model is the base model for all the other four models. It separates
data storage from data processing, requiring at least two independent cloud comput-
ing providers to process data and to store data respectively. This can help ease users’
concerns on having a single provider to have complete control over the data and the
services they use.
The Availability Model introduces redundancy into the Separation Model, in both
the data processing and the data storage. With the redundancy in the Availability
Model, failures of one data processing service and one data storage service can be
tolerated.
The Tunnel Model further enhances the Separation Model by using a Tunnel Ser-
vice to impose an isolation between the Data Processing Service and the Cloud Stor-
age Service. The Tunnel Service prevents collusion by cutting the direct communica-
tions between the Data Processing Service and the Cloud Storage Service, assuming
that it is very unlikely for two isolated providers to collude. The Tunnel Service can
also be used to impose filtering on the communications between the Data Processing
Service and the Cloud Storage Service to enforce security policies.
The Cryptography Model augments the Tunnel Model with cryptography support,
such as data encryption, decryption, and digital signing. The Cryptography Model
allows transparent secure data storage by encrypting the data before storing and de-
crypting the data on access, and it can also prevent unauthorized modification by
associating digital signatures with the data. Depending on the security requirements,
cryptography support can be adjusted differently to fit into the application scenarios.
Note that, in Table 1, SM, AM, MM, TM, CM stand for Separation Model, Avail-
ability Model, Migration Model, Tunnel Model, and Cryptography Model respec-
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SM AM MM TM CM
Separation of Duty X X X X X
Cross-clouds Service and Data Availability X
Cross-clouds Fault Tolerance X
Data Migration X
Anti-collusion X X
Data Confidentiality X
Data Integrity X
Table 1 Feature Summary
tively. Each of the five proposed models focus on different aspects of the security
requirements, where the Separation Model serves as the base model for the other
four models.
Note also that, the proposed models can be combined together to implement more
security features than a single model. For example, the Migration Model can be com-
bined with the Cryptography Model, in which case the combined model can provide
data migration, anti-collusion, data confidentiality, and data integrity.
5.1 Model Comparison
The proposed deployment models are different from existing work in the following
aspects.
– The techniques employed are mostly on the deployment level. Most of the previ-
ous work focuses on implementation levels, such as cryptography protocols and
algorithms [28,43,40], design patterns and for system design and implementa-
tion [20,30,38,26,8,17], and internal control mechanisms [21,11,14], and so on.
These techniques and research relate to the internal implementation, instead of
the deployment architecture.
– The proposed models rely on inter-cloud interaction and require multiple clouds
to cooperate. All five proposed deployment models require the involvement of
at least two clouds, while existing work mostly investigate the techniques that
can be used within a single system, such as the architecture for a network [35,
45,44], or techniques for building middleware or services [8,17] . The scope of
the security provided by these existing techniques is confined to the domain of
homogeneous systems.
– The proposed models are user oriented. Design and implementation techniques/methods
are development oriented and are opaque for users. Most users will not see the dif-
ference between two systems built on different design and implementation tech-
niques, unless the techniques are user interface related. The deployment models
require the cooperation of multiple clouds and create user awareness with respect
to this concept. By doing this, users’ trust in deploying IT systems on cloud com-
puting would be increased.
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5.2 Compatibility
The proposed deployment models assume that the cloud services involved are com-
patible with each other. The compatibility could be guaranteed by defining standard-
ized interaction interfaces between the cloud services. This will include the following.
– Data Access Interface (DAI). DAI should be implemented by the Cloud Storage
Service and used by the Data Processing Services to access data on the Cloud
Storage Service.
– Data Replication Interface (DRI). DRI should be implemented by the Cloud Stor-
age Service and used by the Data Replication Service to synchronize data between
two Cloud Storage Services.
– Data Migration Interface (DMI). DMI should be implemented by the Cloud Stor-
age Service and used by Cloud Data Migration Service to export data from and
import data into Cloud Storage Services.
– Data Tunneling Interface (DTI). DTI should be implemented by the Data Tunnel-
ing Service and used by the Data Processing Service tunnel DAI interactions.
Once these interfaces are defined and implemented by the corresponding services,
the services will be able to interoperate with each other as expected by the proposed
deployment models.
6 Conclusion
This article identifies the security concerns that users may have when adopting cloud
computing, including fault tolerance and service availability, data migration, and data
confidentiality and integrity. To eliminate these security concerns, five deployment
models are proposed and described in detail, showing various architecture of de-
ploying IT systems on cloud computing infrastructure. These deployment models are
developed to address the security issues raised by the identified security concerns.
The proposed models are not without their limitations. As the proposed models
are at deployment architecture level, they do not include specific protocols and al-
gorithms that can provide supports on confidentiality and integrity at cryptography
level. Corresponding design patterns and interfaces should also be developed to al-
low cloud based applications can be deployed on clouds in the manners specified by
the proposed models.
6.1 Contributions
The contribution of this article is five fold.
– This article has presented a review on related research, providing a clear overview
of the current progress of related work.
– This article identifies the three most important user concerns with respect to
adopting cloud computing. We argue that these concerns are the major obstacles
for users to adopt cloud computing.
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– This article proposes to eliminate the user concerns by using specific architecture
for the deployment of IT systems on cloud computing.
– This article proposes five deployment models, each of which is developed to
tackle specific issues raised by the users.
– This article, to the best knowledge of the authors, is the first article that proposes
user oriented methods to increase users’ trust on cloud computing.
6.2 Future Research
Future research on this work will include the development of corresponding design
patterns and interfaces for cloud based applications to fit into the proposed deploy-
ment models and the investigation on integrating security protocols and algorithms
with the proposed models to provide security support at cryptography level. We also
find providing support for these deployment models at platform level interesting. In
this case, by federating one or more clouds, they can cooperate to allow user applica-
tions be deployed in the proposed way in a transparent manner.
To a large extent, our deployment models solve the challenges regarding privacy
and confidentiality of data at rest, but there still remains the issue of users having
to trust the cloud data processing provider and/or the cloud cryptography service
provider with their data. A fundamental area of further work on the technology side
is thus to devise cloud data processing services that function without having access
to a customer’s complete data in clear text. A possible approach to this would be
to extend the availability model to let each data processing provider only process
parts of the customer’s data, returning the complete results (via the encrypted tunnel
model) only to the customer.
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